A new working paper circulating among economists and political historians poses a provocative question: What might have happened if the United States had taken Pat Buchanan’s warnings about unchecked globalization seriously and adopted his protectionist trade policies decades earlier?
Buchanan, a conservative commentator, former Nixon and Reagan adviser, and three-time presidential candidate, was often dismissed in the 1990s as a political outsider with outdated views.
While much of Washington embraced free trade agreements like NAFTA and supported entry into the World Trade Organization, Buchanan sounded alarms about what he called the “surrender of American sovereignty” and the hollowing out of U.S. industry. He argued that unfettered globalization would devastate manufacturing, weaken the middle class, and tie America’s future to foreign powers.
The new paper revisits these arguments in light of the economic upheavals of the past 30 years. The authors examine historical data on factory closures, job losses in manufacturing-heavy regions, and the widening income gap between college-educated professionals and blue-collar workers.
They contrast this with a hypothetical model in which the U.S. had followed Buchanan’s policy prescriptions: strict tariffs on imports, rejection of free trade pacts, and incentives for companies to keep production within U.S. borders.
According to the paper’s findings, had such policies been implemented in the 1980s or early 1990s, the United States might have preserved more of its manufacturing base. Regions like the Rust Belt, which suffered deep industrial decline, could have experienced slower job loss, less economic dislocation, and potentially more stable communities.
The authors suggest that some of the political polarization of recent decades—fueled in part by economic resentment—might have been less severe if industrial towns had not faced such rapid decline.
At the same time, the paper acknowledges trade-offs. A protectionist model would likely have resulted in higher consumer prices, less efficiency in global supply chains, and slower growth in sectors that benefited from globalization, such as technology and finance.
The U.S. would have been less integrated into the global economy, which could have limited opportunities for export-driven industries and strained relations with allies who supported trade liberalization.
The paper also explores the political dimension. Buchanan’s views, once marginalized, gained new relevance with the rise of populist movements in both parties.
Former President Donald Trump’s “America First” trade agenda echoed many of Buchanan’s warnings, including skepticism of multilateral trade deals and a push for tariffs on imports from China. The authors argue that Buchanan, while ahead of his time, foreshadowed debates that would dominate American politics decades later.
Perhaps most striking is the suggestion that adopting Buchanan’s policies earlier might have altered the trajectory of U.S. politics itself. If economic displacement had been less severe, the populist backlash of the 2010s—visible in movements from the Tea Party to Bernie Sanders’ progressive campaign—might have unfolded differently. America, the paper argues, might have remained more economically balanced, though at the cost of greater isolation from global trade networks.
Ultimately, the authors stop short of declaring Buchanan “right” or “wrong.” Instead, they frame the study as a thought experiment—an exploration of the costs and benefits of globalization through the lens of one of its fiercest critics. What is clear, however, is that Buchanan’s once-controversial warnings no longer seem so far-fetched.
By asking what might have been, the paper invites Americans to reconsider the choices that shaped the modern economy—and whether the future requires a course correction toward the kind of trade nationalism Buchanan championed decades ago.
